GroupOn is like “dating in NYC”…therefore, every merchant’s nightmare!

Well, you can replace “NYC” with “LA” or any other major metropolitan city that offers too much of a good thing – a proliferation of single eligible men & women (which is a paradox in itself.) The simplistic theory that explains this paradox is the non-committal factor, since everyone is waiting for the “next best thing.” Why commit to a relationship when you are swimming in a sea of options? Too much of a good thing can be dangerous for commitments.

And this is the story of the avid GroupOn user. For GroupOn to succeed, it needs to generate excitement and loyalty to its business. However, GroupOn loyalty outrightly means non-commitment to a merchant, the merchant that GroupOn is designed to serve … and hence, the nightmare of the small business begins.

Loyalty is what most businesses thrive on. Loyalty makes a business sell not 1, but 100 widgets to one consumer, increasing profits. But, the case with GroupOn is a bit more complex. When GroupOn creates loyalty to its business model, it creates a vulture who thrives on deals…a vulture that is waiting for the next best deal…this vulture is not the ideal customer that the small business had in mind when signing up for GroupOn. The merchant’s viability and interest in GroupOn is to attract a new user base who will eventually become loyal customers of its establishment and not of GroupOn. But, that is in absolute contradiction with what will make GroupOn thrive & explode in success.

The conflict of interests is deepened by competition that has innovated in the deals space to further shape the future phsychology of this vulture to become even fiercer deal hunter. Such recent innovation is the “instant deals.” With instant deals, the consumer can plan its day around the deals available to him on that day.

Although, the instant deal can be a fantastic “just-in-time” inventory clearing mechanism, or extra capacity management for a merchant, when adopted by the majority it will become the merchant’s nightmare. Everyday, one of your competitors, featuring the deal, will be stealing your customer base, who now have become GroupOn loyalists.

Of course, this theory is only valid if GroupOn and the deals industry become really successful. So, let’s revisit the numbers from GroupOn. In my first blog of this series -“GroupOn’s valuation myth debunked!!! A cautionary tale of the deals industry…” I visit GroupOn’s valuation. The $30 billion valuation for GroupOn tells us how optimistic investors are about the industry. For GroupOn to be worth that, it needs to become at least a $15 billion business, therefore, needs to sell at least 600 Million deals a year (based on average revenue of $23 per deal see S-1 filings). Either U.S. will more than double its population or GroupOn will have to create a lot of loyal customers who will buy quite a few deals per year. Now if we add Living Social, Facebook’s deals, we can picture the gigantic success investors expect.

Unfortunately, the small/local business who is the GroupOn user is so fragmented that they will not have the typical power to restrain GroupOn’s empire. The death of the small business will come slowly and ‘unexpectedly’ by the vulture that GroupOn will create. “Unexpectedly,” because a small local merchant will fail to see beyond the short-term effects, meanwhile the downfall will be building up and will be macroeconomic in nature.

GroupOn creates a conflict between its success and the success it promises to the small business. However, GroupOn has a potential to succeed, which is not based on “rational” theory, but the pshychology of the merchant and consumer. Read “Why will GroupOn succeed?” for more.

GroupOn’s valuation myth debunked!!! A cautionary tale of the deals industry…

GroupOn’s ability to survive lies solely in its ingenious appeal to the psychology of the consumer and merchant – its valuation is outrageously irrational; its business model equally flawed from “rational” economic players perspective, yet I will confidently say it has high chances to succeed, as long as the psychological game persists and remains unchallenged. In a series of blogs, I will debunk the valuation of GroupOn and the deal industry, in general.

Since its IPO announcement, a lot of investor mania has surrounded GroupOn. But, is its value of $30 billion justifiable?

The true value of an asset, theoretically, equals how much cash it can generate in the future. Using this simplistic theory, GroupOn’s $30billion valuation assumes that the company soon will grow to at least $15B in revenue (estimate arrived using 10% discount rate, 20% margin and other projections by GroupOn). Given its revenue growth and consumer’s willingness to pay, such projection seems aggressive, but well within the realm of reasonableness. However, the challenge lies on the supply side. $15 billion of GroupOn revenue equates to $45 billion a year that small/local businesses will have to part with and hand it to GroupOn as marketing expense. (GroupOn keeps 1/3rd of the deal)

As all valuation models are based on the assumption that decisions are purely “rational”, a merchant shall accept a deal with GroupOn only if it can generate positive ROI. From the macroeconomic scale, the GroupOn model simply crumbles.

The fundamental question to ask is if GroupOn actually contributes to value creation or redistribution of funds? Are you, as a consumer, spending more of your income or simply allocating your disposable income differently because of GroupOn? The simple answer is the latter. GroupOn has no capacity to create economic value, but it merely redistributes revenue from non-GroupOn merchants to GroupOn merchants. The question that bags itself is: If all merchants participate in a GroupOn offering, then where will the redistribution come from?

Based on data provided by the SBA and Economic Census Bureau, it is estimated that small businesses, at best, in the consumer sector, generate about $1-$2 trillion in annual sales. Assuming 10% profit margin, all consumer small business profits are around $100-$200 billion. For GroupOn to generate the revenue it forecasts, at least, ALL small businesses shall sign a deal with GroupOn and decide to give away $45 billion out of $100 billion profits they make. Wow, that’s a whopping 45%.
If not all merchants participate, the story is even more bleak. The $45 billion will have to come from smaller number of merchants.


Aha, two fallacies in the valuation are exposed. Is it reasonable to assume that ALL small businesses will sign up? And second, will a rational business owner simply give away a quarter, or half, of its net cash receipts to GroupOn, when there is no promise of true revenue growth or positive ROI? Let’s remember that GroupOn’s valuation of $30billion requires that almost all small businesses sign up for a deal with the Company…therefore, no net redistribution of revenue will be possible. Month 1, one merchant will pocket more revenue as a result of its GroupOn deal; however, in months 2-12 it will forgo its revenues to fund the redistribution of industry receipts to its rivals featuring a GroupOn deal.

And of course, let us not forget the copy cats proliferating the market. One might ask if international expansion is their basis for growth…that sounds too optimistic - China alone has already launched over a 100 GroupOn competitors. It’s an industry with zero barriers to entry, and therefore, competition is rampant.

If GroupOn’s valuation appears so optimistic, the entire industry taken together appears highly speculative. I would highly caution any venture capitalist, and investor pouring funds into the industry.

But, where did this all start? The deals industry… The power or bargaining power… The concept of offering a deal to seduce customers… Read “The myth of the deals industry” for more.